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Over the last two decades, Axel Honneth has written extensively on the
notion of social pathology. He has presented it as a distinctive critical
resource of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, in which tradition he places
his own work; and as an alternative to the mainstream liberal approaches
in political philosophy. In this paper, I review the developments in
Honneth’s writing about this notion and offer an immanent critique, with a
particular focus on his recent major work Freedom’s Right. Both his early
context-transcendent approach and his more recent immanent approach
are found wanting, and his increasing reformism is exposed and criticized.
The central distinction in Freedom’s Right between social pathologies and
misdevelopments is also shown to be unworkable. In addition,
I demonstrate that Zurn’s influential proposal to characterize the
phenomena Honneth identified as social pathologies in terms of a
cognitive disconnect does not fit (with Zurn’s own description of) these
phenomena. While some such phenomena, like what Honneth describes as
‘‘Organized Self-Realization,’’ call out for conceptualization in terms of the
notion of social pathology, an alternative characterization of this notion is
necessary.
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Over the last two decades, Axel Honneth has written extensively on the notion of
social pathology, presenting it as a distinctive critical resource of Frankfurt School
Critical Theory, in which tradition he places himself, and as an alternative to the
mainstream liberal approaches in political philosophy. In this paper, I review the
developments of Honneth’s writing on this notion and offer an immanent critique,
with a particular focus on his recent major work Freedom’s Right. Tracing the use
of, and problems internal to, Honneth’s concept of social pathology serves to
demonstrate his increasing reformism. It also serves to catalogue some of the dead
ends that Critical Theory should avoid in taking up the idea of social pathology.
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The implication is not that this idea should be dropped. Rather, the paper is
undertaking the necessary step of clearing the ground for further progress to take
place on the question of what role the idea of social pathology can and should
play in Critical Theory. The paper is critical in nature (and relentlessly so), but
ultimately serves a constructive purpose.
I. ‘‘Pathologies of the Social’’
As a first step, Honneth characterized the idea of social pathologies in a 1994 paper,
called “Pathologies of the Social.”1 He connects this idea with Rousseau, at least
indirectly insofar as he presents Rousseau as the founding father of social
philosophy, whereby he understands social philosophy as the diagnosis of
social deviations, including social pathologies (or possibly equated with social
pathologies – the German original is ambiguous on this point).2
There are four systematic points worth highlighting from this paper. Firstly,
Honneth claims, plausibly, that a social pathology implies a notion of normality.3
This raises a challenging question of how, if at all, we become acquainted with (and
know of) that notion and how we can justify it. Honneth notes that the tendency of
thinkers is to appeal either (A) to a natural state of human beings (either as
historical state or as part of an anthropology) or (B) to a projected future.4 He
thinks that both raise (different) problems.
Secondly, the idea of social pathology is “ordered by ethical criteria,” understood
(presumably following Habermas) as differentiated from moral criteria, which also
means that this idea is distinguished from mainstream liberal political philosophy,
focusing as it does on justice and legitimacy.5 Honneth ties ethical criteria to the
idea of human self-realization.6 One might be concerned that this focus on self-
realization narrows ethical criteria too much, but this depends on how this idea is
understood. Given that Honneth links self-realization to talk of a fulfilled,
successful, and good life,7 he seems to understand it in a sufficiently broad way to
remove this concern. However, this, in turn, might create problems: in particular,
1 “Pathologien des Sozialen. Tradition und Aktualita¨t der Sozialphilosophie,” in Pathologien des Sozialen: Die
Aufgabe der Sozialphilosophie, ed. A. Honneth (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1994), 9–69. All references are to the
English translation (“Pathologies of the Social: The Past and Present of Social Philosophy”) in The Handbook of
Critical Theory, ed. D. Rasmussen (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), Ch. 16.
2 Honneth writes “es in der Sozialphilosophie vordringlich um eine Bestimmung und Ero¨rterung von solchen
Entwicklungsprozessen der Gesellschaft geht, die sich als Fehlentwicklungen oder Sto¨rungen, eben als ‘Pathologien des
Sozialen’, begreifen lassen” (“Pathologien des Sozialen,” 10). This leaves unclear whether he sees all social deviations as
social pathologies, or already makes a twofold distinction among them – whether “eben als ‘Pathologien des Sozialen’
[thus as ‘social pathologies’]” refers to only “Sto¨rungen [distortions]” or both “Fehlentwicklungen [misdevelopments]”
and “Sto¨rungen.” The English rendering – “decline, distortions, or even as ‘social pathologies’” (“Pathologies of the
Social,” 370) – not only masks this ambiguity, but also – wrongly – suggests a threefold distinction. At any rate,
Honneth later – as we will see – makes the twofold distinction.
3 “Pathologies of the Social,” 387.
4 “Pathologies of the Social,” 390.
5 “Pathologies of the Social,” 371, 375, 388, and more implicit on 370. To be precise, social pathologies might also
involve injustice, but they are “not simply [about] injustice” (388). Indeed, Honneth talks about social pathologies in
terms of “moral impotence” (380) and “moral impoverishment” (381) – either suggesting that social pathologies have
to do with moral matters after all, or accidentally slipping into talk of “moral,” where he means “ethical.”
6 “Pathologies of the Social,” 372, 375, 391.
7 “Pathologies of the Social,” 374, 376, 377, 384.
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it is unclear how much work such a broad notion can still do (I return to the wider
issue of empty formalism below).
Thirdly, Honneth suggests that social pathologies are characterized by a dynamic
process of development, which is described in terms of an “incessant circle” and as
having its own logic.8 Thus, the diagnosis of social pathologies is not simply the
diagnosis of a state of affairs, but rather of social processes, which, if not stopped or
reversed, will lead to a further deterioration – just like an infection of the body.
Finally, Honneth argues that any defensible thesis about social pathology
requires a perspective “from which the social events could be determined as a
deviation from an ideal.”9 Specifically, he turns to a formal ethic to provide this,
favouring a “weak formal anthropology,” which “outlines the universal conditions
of an unforced articulation of human life ideals.”10 Honneth thinks that the
“knowledge-interest” of social philosophy directs it “to a universal measure for the
normality of social life”; and notes that a historically limited concept of normality is
too restrictive for social philosophy.11
There are two possible objections to this argument. First, it is unclear why a
universalistic perspective is required to determine a deviation from an ideal – after
all, there is a long tradition of what is usually called immanent social critique,
where certain states of affairs or developments (say the detrimental effects of
increasing economic inequality on democratic politics) are criticized as deviation
from an ideal which is accepted within a social context (say, in this case,
democracy). It might be that immanent critique of this sort is not possible in all
societies or otherwise problematic, but Honneth does not demonstrate this.
(Indeed, as we will see below, he turns to it in his most recent work.) Moreover an
appeal to the knowledge-interest of social philosophy is not sufficient here, since it
is questionable that the knowledge-interest is of fundamental importance in this
context (rather than, say, the practical interest in social transformation, which need
not require appeal to a universal standard). In addition, Honneth seems to operate
with a rather narrow set of alternatives here – either a culture-specific or universal
measure of normality. For example Foucault and Taylor – whom he targets here
explicitly – might be operating more with what might be called an e´poque-specific
standard, rather than one specific only to French or Canadian culture. What they
are concerned with is certain commitments internal to Western modernity – say a
commitment to freedom.12 This might actually be much closer to what Habermas
and, elsewhere, Honneth affirm than Honneth’s comments here suggest.13
8 “Pathologies of the Social,” 370, 374, 383.
9 “Pathologies of the Social,” 392.
10 “Pathologies of the Social,” 393–94.
11 “Pathologies of the Social,” 393 and 388 respectively.
12 Consider, for example, Foucault’s claim: “Je caracte´riserai donc l’e´thos philosophique propre a` l’ontologie critique
de nous-meˆmes comme une e´preuve historico-pratique des limites que nous pouvons franchir, et donc comme travail de
nous-meˆmes sur nous-meˆmes en tant qu’eˆtres libres” (“Qu’est-ce que les Lumie`res?” [1984], reprinted in Dits et e´crits
Vol. IV (1980–88) (Paris: Galimard, 1994), 562–78, here 575; emphasis in the original).
13 For Habermas, see Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F.G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987,
originally in German [1985]); for Honneth, see Das Recht der Freiheit: Grundriß einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit
(Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011); trans. J. Ganahl as Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014).
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Second, one might dispute that a universalistic standard – if there is one at all – is
accessible to us. How, given that we are socialized within specific contexts which
also set limits to our language use and imagination, can we lay claim to a standard
that is meant to hold outside of this context, or even universally? Indeed, the
authors to whom Honneth ascribed the idea of social pathology will be among
those most sceptical about this demand and also about the suggestion of a formal
anthropology and ethic. To take just one example, Marx famously denied that the
idea that all human beings suffer hunger is informative, since hunger satisfied in one
way is radically different from hunger satisfied in another way.14 He – and Hegel
before him – can be read to insist that whatever we can say about a formal ethic and
anthropology will be too abstract and empty to guide us in our practical
endeavours, or will just reproduce the context-specific substance from which it is
meant to be independent.
As we will see later, Honneth, in effect, abandons in his most recent writings the
idea of a formal ethic, and for the very reasons just mentioned: the fact that we are
always historically situated and the insight that any formal ethics (or morality) is
too empty until and unless it is substantiated historically (upon which it is not
simply the same with details added to it).
II. Social pathologies of reason
In later papers, Honneth does not just set out the idea of social pathology, but
ascribes a particular version of it to Frankfurt School Critical Theory as constitutive
of its approach.15 Noteworthy in this context is his 2004 paper “A Social Pathology
of Reason: on the intellectual legacy of Critical Theory.”16 Here the focus is on
Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas.
Some of the same points reappear from the first paper – such as the ethical
dimension of social pathologies, in contrast to the dominant liberal concern with
moral categories like justice – but Honneth presents three fundamental
specifications as constitutive and distinctive of Critical Theory’s use of the idea of
social pathologies.
First, in a move that Honneth characterizes as “unique [einzigartig ]”– unique,
I take it, among contemporary approaches – Critical Theory insists on “the concept
of socially efficacious reason.”17 FollowingHegel, the idea is that a social pathology
is given whenever a society falls short of the “‘objectively’ already possible
rationality.”18 In contrast, “a successful form of society is only possible by
14 Grundrisse [1857], MEW Vol. 42: 27.
15 In this paper, whenever I refer to “Critical Theory” from now on, I mean to denote the Frankfurt School’s strand(s)
of it.
16 This paper appeared originally in German (“Eine soziale Pathologie der Vernunft: Zur intellektuellen Erbschaft der
Kritischen Theorie”) in Axel Honneth: Sozialphilosophie zwischen Kritik und Anerkennung, ed. C. Halbig and
M. Quante (Mu¨nster: Lit Verlag, 2004), 9–38; and English in Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory, ed. F. Rush
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Ch. 13. I cite from the extended version that appeared as “Critical
Theory” in The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. D. Moran (London/New York:
Routledge, 2008), Ch. 18.
17 “Critical Theory,” 785.
18 “Critical Theory,” 786.
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maintaining at the highest level the appropriate standard of rationality.”19 Thus,
both the notion of social pathology and normality are tied here to rationality and its
historical unfolding.
Second, the process of a deformation of rationality has one specific cause in the
Critical Theory tradition: capitalism. Here Honneth emphasizes the influence of
Luka´cs, according to whom “Mechanized practical work and commodity exchange
demand a form of perception in which all other humans appear as thing-like beings
lacking sensation, so that social interaction is robbed of any attention to properties
valuable in themselves.”20 Such a narrowing of perception implies a narrowing of
rationality – to instrumental rationality in the service of self-interest – and leads to
a variety of social ills (not least the exploitative, alienating relations of capitalism).
This model – though perhaps not the specifics of the content – is then adopted by
Critical Theory and applied to a variety of contexts. While Honneth does not
explicitly say so, the social pathologies that capitalism causes reveal it to have
structural deficits, such that – at least for the first generation of Critical Theory –
the only cure is to rid us of capitalism.
Third, the idea of social pathology in Critical Theory is always conjoined with an
account of the emancipatory interest in overcoming it. Honneth here credits Freud
with a formative influence on Critical Theory. In particular, two insights are taken
over from Freud: (a) deficits in rationality always find expression, however
indirectly, in experiences of suffering; and (b) this suffering motivates, and can be
alleviated only by, the search for the very aspects of rationality whose suppression
led to the suffering in the first place.
Honneth suggests that there are obstacles to make each of these three dimensions
work, and that, if onewants to defendCritical Theory’s idea of social pathology (as he
does), then one needs to reconfigure each of them. As we will see, in his ownwork, he
has particularly reconfigured the second and third dimension. Indeed, in a recent
statement about social pathologies of reason, he talks about this idea in a way that
generalizes away from capitalism as a cause to such pathologies being due to the
“structural organization of societies.”21 For example, we will see later how Honneth
describes juridification as a consequence of the normative structure of legal freedom –
its own tendency to become one-sided. The decoupling from capitalism as (direct)
cause of social pathology happens already inHabermas22 – for him, juridification is a
socialpathology that canarise from the structural organizationof societies, but it is not
necessarily causedbycapitalism (at least notdirectly, insofar as juridification can result
fromattempts to contain capitalism – see below forHonneth’s account of social rights
and consumer protection as an example of this sort). Honneth also does not mention
the emancipatory interest anymore.
19 “Critical Theory,” 786.
20 “Critical Theory,” 799.
21 G. Marcelo, “Recognition and Critical Theory today: An interview with Axel Honneth,” Philosophy and Social
Criticism 39, no. 2 (2013): 209–21, here 219.
22 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas
McCarthy (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1987; originally in German [1981]). For discussion, see T. Ju¨tten, “ The
Colonization Thesis: Habermas on Reification,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19, no. 5 (2011):
701–27.
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Honneth states that it is questionable whether there is something that unites all
theorists from (what is often called) the different generations of Critical Theory.23
It is, arguably, particularly questionable that the notion of social pathology
provides this systematic unity. It might do, notably if this notion is not – contrary to
what Honneth recently claimed24 – inevitably tied up with an organicist conception
of society, which would have met with stern criticism from first generation thinkers
like Adorno.25 However, my focus here is not on this wider question, but on
investigating how Honneth aims to conceptualize and defend the notion of social
pathology.
III. Zurn’s characterization
Whether or not there is a concept of social pathology that unifies all thinkers
associated with Critical Theory is one question; but the more pressing one is
whether or not there is such a concept that unifies the various specific phenomena of
which Honneth speaks as social pathologies. It is to this question that I turn now.
In an influential paper, Christopher F. Zurn proposes a common structure of
social pathologies (or at least of those analysed by Honneth): they are second-order
disorders, where this means that they operate “by means of constitutive disconnects
between first-order contents and second-order reflexive comprehension of those
contents, where those disconnects are pervasive and socially caused.”26
This characterization has had an important influence on the development of
Honneth’s own thinking, and it is, hence, useful to briefly review it here. It is also
useful to do so, since the characterization turns out to be largely unconvincing, but
seems to have contributed to a misframing of social pathologies as being primarily
“in the head.” Moreover, this discussion will allow us to introduce some of
Honneth’s own examples of social pathologies prior to (and, in part, different from
those listed in) Freedom’s Right.
Zurn’s structure fits best (his characterization of) Marx’s articulation of a theory
of ideology: those subject to false consciousness are not “cognisant of how those
beliefs come about,”27 and this disconnect is pervasive and socially caused
(involving “hiding or repressing the needed reflexivity of the social participants
about the structures of belief formation and the connection of those cultural-
cognitive structures to the material ordering of the social world”).28 Yet, when it
23 “Critical Theory,” 785. On the idea of generations, see, for example, J. Anderson, “Situating Axel Honneth in the
Frankfurt School Tradition,” in Axel Honneth: Critical Essays, ed. Danielle Petherbridge (Leiden: Brill Academic
Publishers, 2011), Ch. 1. I leave aside here the question of whether Honneth’s characterization of this systematic unity
by way of the three-fold specification of the diagnosis of social pathologies does really differentiate Critical Theory from
other (contemporary) approaches. In particular in relation to Foucault, one might doubt that this is so, but nothing in
this paper hangs on this.
24 A. Honneth, “Die Krankheiten der Gesellschaft. Anna¨herung an einen nahezu unmo¨glichen Begriff,” WestEnd 11,
no. 1 (2014): 45–60, here 46 n. 1, 59.
25 See, for example, his Introduction to Sociology [1968], trans. E. Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1999), 43.
26 “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders,” in Axel Honneth: Critical Essays, ed. D. Petherbridge, Ch. 12, here
345–46. We will see later that Honneth has recently endorsed Zurn’s schema as capturing what he means by social
pathologies – wrongly as I argue in the main text.
27 “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders,” 347.
28 “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders,” 347.
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comes to the real target for this schema – the social pathologies Honneth analyses
(as listed by Zurn: misrecognition, maldistribution, invisibilization, rationality
distortions, reification, and organized self-realization) – Zurn’s schema is a poor fit,
other than perhaps reification.29 Specifically, in the way Zurn himself (accurately)
describes the phenomena Honneth analyses, they are more about a disconnect
between reality and certain ideals (which exist as promises and rational potential
inherent in practices and institutions),30 or about a disconnect between different
norms, than about a cognitive disconnect at the level of the individual.
Consider first misrecognition: this concerns – on Zurn’s own account – cases
where “there is a substantial gap between the evaluative acknowledgement or
promise that the act centres upon, and the institutional and material condition
necessary for the fulfilment of that acknowledgement or promise.”31 Zurn insists
that this by itself would not be a social pathology, unless there would also be a
cognitive disconnect: “Without the second-order disorder, what we might
generically call ‘bad’ acts of recognition (misrecognition, non-recognition)
are not ideological and so cannot count as social pathologies.”32 However,
Zurn’s reasoning here is not convincing. First, something could be non-ideological
and a social pathology (for Honneth). In particular, if misrecognition,
which Honneth clearly takes to be detrimental to individual self-realization, is
pervasive and socially caused, then this would seem to be a social pathology for
him, even if it is not accompanied by the inability of those misrecognized
reflectively to be aware of this. Also, second, it is possible that those perpetuating
the misrecognition are subject to ideological beliefs. If this were so, then
misrecognition would involve ideology, albeit not by the misrecognized. (As we
will see below, Zurn himself accepts something similar in another case:
invisibilization). Thus, even if ideology were a necessary condition for
social pathologies, the fact that the misrecognized are not subject to ideology
would not be sufficient to exclude that the misrecognition they suffer is a social
pathology.
Take next maldistribution and social esteem33 – here too, the disconnect is (again
according to Zurn’s own description) between certain ideals or norms and reality,
specifically “between the regnant evaluative schemas connecting individual
achievements to esteem recognition, and the social institutions that practically
function to recognise or denigrate the actual achievements and worth of
individuals.”34 Zurn then adds that the failure to be recognized appropriately for
one’s contribution to social cooperation also might involve that the individuals
themselves do not recognize their contribution, but it is not convincingly shown
29 See Zurn’s discussion of reification particularly on p. 357 of “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders.”
30 Indeed, the one example of what Honneth considers a social pathology that Zurn does not discuss also concerns the
interrelation between ideals and reality: Hartman and Honneth suggest that neoliberal capitalism transformed the
normative potential of social-democratic capitalism in such a way that – paradoxically – neoliberalism’s promoting of
this potential decreases the probability of actually realizing it (“Paradoxes of Capitalism,” Constellations 13, no. 1
(2006): 41–58; originally in German [2004]).
31 “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders,” 349.
32 “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders,” 349; my emphasis.
33 For Honneth, this is just a particular instance of misrecognition of the sort discussed in the previous paragraph.
34 “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders,” 351.
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that only then would it be a social pathology.35 Is it not detrimental to my self-
realization and well-being that socially pervasive forces make it the case that social
esteem is withheld from me despite the fact that I genuinely contribute to society
(a fact I correctly perceive)? Given how various avenues for self-realization are
connected to social esteem, it would be surprising if lack of social esteem were not
detrimental to self-realization, even if the person her-/himself did not misrecognize
the contribution s/he made to society. Such socially caused detrimental effect
suffices to make it a social pathology (for Honneth).
Then, Zurn turns to group-specific invisibilization, and here he identifies a two-
order structure – the active looking through another, which presupposes a taking
cognisance of the presence of the other in the first place – but it is not the one of the
cognitive disconnect he started with. Indeed, here he admits as much explicitly
himself: “in the case of social invisibilisation thosewho directly suffer from the social
effects are not the same as those subject to the problematic form of reflexivity.”36
Zurn’s treatment of the pathologies of rationality – deficits in the social realization
of historically available rationality – also does not fit his schema: the disconnect is
again not (primarily) about lack of reflexivity of individuals, but one “between social
institutions and the available level of rationality” andbetween“the broadly accepted
sense of what is rational, just, and possible and the latent potential of reason.”37
Moreover, it is rather odd to list pathologies of rationality among the other cases
because they are not really specific instances of social pathology forHonneth, but one
element of his general characterization of social pathologies (as Zurn admits).38
Finally, consider the phenomenon which Honneth describes under the heading of
“organised self-realisation.” In a nutshell, a combination of various social factors
since the 1970s have led to self-realization’s being co-opted into the capitalist
production process, such that people have to feign self-realization activities to
become employed and promoted, and end up experiencing feelings of inner
emptiness and meaninglessness. It seems at first as if they fit Zurn’s schema – as
one’s own mode of self-realization requires reflective endorsement to be
authentic,39 one could imagine a case where the latter second-order reflexivity
could be undermined by social processes. However, the way the actual phenomena
is described is such that the pathology becomes worse by a cognitive connect: it is
“often itself vitiated by the individual’s own recognition that the demand for
individualised self-realisation is itself a productive force, a functionally useful
innovation of post-Fordist capitalism, one playing an ideological role in furthering
neo-liberal deinstitutionalisation and deregulation.”40 If cognitive disconnect
is essential to social pathology, the recognition noted in the quotation could not
vitiate the social pathology, but would end it – whatever would be bad about it
35 In this context, Zurn also muddies the water by talking about “distributive injustice,” where social pathologies are
meant to be about the good and self-realization, not justice and legitimacy. Still, perhaps this can be clarified insofar as
the social pathology is one about esteem, and only causally related to distributive injustice – as a sort of side-effect of it.
36 “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders,” 352–53.
37 “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders,” 353.
38 “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders,” 353.
39 “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders,” 359.
40 “Social Pathologies as Second-Order Disorders,” 360.
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could not be characterized by talk of social pathology on Zurn’s definition of it.
This goes against what Honneth intends.
It is worth considering this in more detail, since Honneth’s discussion of
organized self-realization is perhaps the best example of how the idea of social
pathology might be applied to a recent phenomenon. In “Organized Self-
Realization: Paradoxes of Individualization,”41 Honneth does not argue that these
paradoxes are (or indicate) a social pathology because individual reflection on the
ideals of self-realization pursued is blocked. Just the opposite: Honneth’s argument
relies on people’s awareness of the false (or at least not authentically accepted) first-
order content (the modes of self-realization). In fact, for him, this awareness is not
just a vitiating factor, but part and parcel of the pathology in question – leaving us
either to feign authenticity or flee into depression.42 In this way, the interesting
suggestion of this rich text is that social pathology does (or at least can) consist in
the process by which the pursuit of an ideal (here self-realization) sabotages its own
realization due to certain social conditions.
It is to the credit ofHonneth during hismiddle period that he identifies awhole range
of social pathologies. As shown in this section, Zurn’s attempt to systematize them into
one schema is unsuccessful. Zurn locates social pathologies too much at the reflective
level of individuals (toomuch“in thehead,” so to speak), not at the level of reality – it is
true that pathologiesmight find expression in a cognitive disconnect, but they neednot.
They are not essentially located at the reflective level of individuals (“in the head”).
Unfortunately,Honneth in hismore recentwork falls into a similar trap – aswewill see
now. He ends up systematizing and relocating the phenomena in ways that are
problematic and fall behind the level of insight reached in his earlier diagnoses.
IV. Freedom’s Right
The ideaof social pathologyplays an important role inHonneth’s recentmajorwork,
Freedom’sRight: The Social Foundations ofDemocratic Life.43However, there are a
number of changes to how this idea is conceived and to Honneth’s overall view.
One of the novelties of this book compared to the earlier work on social pathology
is that Honneth now articulates his views in terms of a conception of justice, no
longer couching them in ethical criteria understood as different from justice and
other moral criteria. Rather than eschewing the idea of justice altogether, Honneth’s
strategy is now to expand it beyond the procedural notions he thinks have dominated
the literature for too long – basically the notions operative in the work of Rawls and
those writing within his basic framework as well as (albeit for somewhat different
reasons) in Habermas’s theory of justice.44 The significance of this novelty vis-a`-vis
41 I cite the reprinted English translation in The I in We (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), Ch. 9; originally in German [2002].
42 “Organized Self-Realization,” 167.
43 See footnote 13. References first to the English and then the German edition.
44 The shift to a broader conception of justice is not entirely novel to Honneth’s corpus, but can be backdated at least to
“The Fabric of Justice: On the Limits of Contemporary Proceduralism” (in The I in We, Ch. 3; originally in German
[2009]). It is, arguably, already part of Honneth’s stance in N. Fraser & A. Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A
Political-Philosophical Exchange (New York: Verso, 2003). The papers on social pathology cited above, however,
operate with a narrower conception of justice – as should be evident from the German title of the collection of papers in
which the first appears (“Das Andere der Gerechtigkeit [The Other of Justice]”).
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the earlier work ought not to be exaggerated, for justice is actually not playing a big
role in the argument. The emphasis is on freedom, specifically social freedom, and
this remains tied to notions of self-realization. Honneth also continues to contrast
social pathologies with injustices,45 either suggesting an inconsistency in his stance
on justice or that the contrast is now with procedural justice only. Charity suggests
the second reading.
A second, more important novelty is that Honneth eschews formal anthropology
and ethics, and opts instead for a historically specific account of the norms with
which he operates. Part of the reason for this is that Honneth conceives of his book
as basically an updated version of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, and thereby ties his
outlook much more closely to the actual historical developments of modern
liberalism (especially in Germany) than in his earlier work. The English title of the
book is actually more fitting in this regard than the German one (which is closer to
Hegel’s original title of his philosophy of right, Grundlinien der Philosophie des
Rechts): instead of suggesting an instance of theorizing (a sketch or ground plan),
the English title reveals the importance of actual social reality, of “social
foundations,” for Honneth. This change is far more significant than the first change
to a broader conception of justice. Freedom’s Right is devoid of any reference to
formal anthropology and a formal ethic of self-realization, which – as seen above –
were crucial for his initial discussion of social pathology (and also for his first major
work, The Struggle for Recognition).46
Given its significance, let me illustrate this point. Honneth begins his book by
lamenting the “decoupling” of most of today’s political philosophy from the
analysis of society.47 The idea of pure normative theorizing – and thereby of
deriving a standard (supposedly) independent of one’s own society – is clearly
rejected. Indeed, those who aim to provide a moral standard independently from
considerations about the historical and social context – like (on Honneth’s reading)
Rainer Forst – are accused of producing a theory of justice that is “completely
empty.”48 Similarly, Korsgaard and Habermas are accused of overlooking the
socio-cultural conditions of moral reasoning, not least the thick descriptions of
social roles, like being a friend or a teacher.49 Without such thick – and thereby
inevitably historically contextual – descriptions, moral reasoning becomes empty
or otherwise indeterminate.
Honneth does not fully appreciate what this move entails. In particular, he does
not realize that this move speaks against the viability of the ambition – which he
45 Freedom’s Right, 86/157.
46 Originally in German, Der Kampf um Anerkennung: Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte (Frankfurt
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1992); translated as The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts by
J. Anderson, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005). In an interview, Honneth recognizes this point, saying that in Freedom’s
Right “the anthropological impulse that drove my earlier work has taken a back seat to a more immanent
‘grammatology’ of modern recognition orders” (R. Willig, “Grammatology of Modern Recognition Orders: An
Interview with Axel Honneth,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 13, no. 1 (2012): 145–49, here
148). See also Marcelo, “Recognition and Critical Theory today,” where Honneth also distances himself from “an
anthropological misunderstanding” invited by “a certain ambivalence” in Struggles of Recognition and suggests that
his three spheres of recognition have historically developed and might be novel to modernity, not universal (210–11).
47 Freedom’s Right, 1/14.
48 Freedom’s Right, 337–38 n. 6/39 n. 6.
49 Freedom’s Right, 100, 108ff/183, 197ff.
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retains in Freedom’s Right – to offer a rational justification of the substance of his
theory of justice that is independent from social foundations (something which, if
successful, would distance his view from the theories of Walzer, Miller, and
MacIntyre).50 He aims to fulfil this ambition by appeal to a metaphysically
abstinent variant of Hegel’s philosophy of history. To see how this falls foul of his
move against Forst et al. (as well as facing other problems), we need to look at
Honneth’s appeal in more detail.
Honneth asserts that “The fact that subjects actively preserve and reproduce
freedom-guaranteeing [ freiheitsverbu¨rgenden ] institutions is theoretical evidence of
their historical value.”51 This is a pivotal passage insofar as Honneth wants to
maintain a version of Hegel’s historical teleology and specifically his view of the
modern state as the most progressive human formation merely on the basis of the
active support of its citizens for this formation, jettisoning Hegel’s metaphysical
foundations. For – so Honneth reasons – if the population actively support the
current social institutions this must mean that they see them as the most progressive
there havebeen,makinganymetaphysical arguments to this effect unnecessary (which
is fortunate, since these arguments, in Honneth’s view, are no longer convincing).
This reasoning cries out for criticism, especially on the basis of the ideology
critique so important to the (first generation of the) Critical Theory tradition. It does
not follow from the mere fact that institutions guarantee some freedoms and people
actively reproduce them, that these people think that the institutions are the best
there ever have been; nor, indeed, that the institutions deserve the active support they
receive. False consciousness can make us actively support what we would not so
support, but instead oppose, ifwewere free from this false consciousness.52Themere
fact that a society guarantees some freedom does not suffice to show that it does not
generate false consciousness.53
Moreover, even leaving aside false consciousness, Honneth’s claim does not stand
up to critical scrutiny: if I practically support a particular set of institutions then this
does indeed commit me to thinking that these institutions are better (or less bad)
than some other set of institutions that is historically available now, but this need
not mean that I need to view them as the best there ever have been. Thus, for
example, I can actively participate in the institution of peer-review assessment of
research excellence which is decisive in the allocation of research funds to
universities in the UK (and elsewhere) simply because the likely alternative – a
50 For Honneth’s criticism of their conceptions of justice as lacking such an additional step, see Freedom’s Right, 2/16.
51 Freedom’s Right, 59/112; translation amended. The German “freiheitsverbu¨rgenden Institutionen” is not well-
captured by “free institutions” (As Ganahl’s official translation has it). Honneth’s point is that these institutions make
freedom possible by offering certain guarantees. An authoritarian state might – say in preventing a civil war – make
certain freedoms (such as freedom of religion) possible, but need not be itself free – it can be “freiheitsverbu¨rgend,” but
nonetheless “unfrei.”
52 One might reply here by saying that Honneth allows – even insists on – the possibility of false consciousness insofar
as he suggests that people can misunderstand and misapply social norms (indeed, this is central to his revised version of
social pathology; see main text below). Interestingly, however, Honneth does not even consider this possibility when it
comes to active support of freedom-guaranteeing institutions, but takes this support simply at face value. This is
symptomatic: he presupposes that the fundamental social norms of current liberal societies are defensible and merely
require fuller realization – indeed, this has become so axiomatic for him that he suspends critical scrutiny of the support
of these norms in the very attempt to defend them.
53 See also Schaub, “Misdevelopments, Pathologies, and Normative Revolutions,” Critical Horizons, this issue.
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metrics-based assessment – strikes me as even worse. This does not mean that
I view peer-review assessment – or have to view it – as the best possible system for
such an allocation. For example, I might prefer an allocation simply on the basis of
the number of researchers employed in a university compared to either of these two
alternatives – this was the allocation mechanism that preceded the current system
in the UK. However, I might judge a return to it politically unfeasible in current
circumstance, and hence actively support the peer-review mechanism as the least
bad available option.
In addition, even if one granted for argument’s sake Honneth’s claim that active
support for existing institutions showed that the individuals in questions were
committed to the view that these institutions are the best there have ever been, this
wouldnot suffice forhis purposes. Ineffect,Honneth faces adilemmahere (in thewake
of his move against Forst et al.): whatever criteria individuals use to judge past
arrangements as worse than the current ones they actively support are either (1)
historically inflected in variousways or (2) too empty to be of any use to us. Eitherway
Honneth’s appeal to a metaphysically abstinent Hegelian teleology cannot generate
rational or moral validity independent from the existing social foundations. This also
means that Honneth fails in distancing himself fromWalzer, Miller, andMacIntyre –
like them, he can onlymake judgements about progress in terms of context-immanent
criteria. Any other candidate criteria would not be genuine criteria because too empty
and formal.
Without a working independent foundation that shows that existing social norms
are the best there ever could be (or at least the best currently available ones),
Honneth’s reformist commitment to these norms is unwarranted by his own
standards. Restricting oneself to context-immanent criteria need not exclude
radical social critique – for example a society might be shown to systematically fail
to live up to its own standards, or harbour within it social movements that point
beyond it.
Honneth’s overcommitment to a merely reformist project becomes clear when we
consider his discussion of Marx. According to Honneth, any unfreedom and
exploitation of workers should be addressedwithin the capitalist system because no
practical alternative to it is currently identifiable.54 Here he abandons another key
insight of (at least the first generation of) Critical Theory and, indeed of Marx (and
even Hegel): anticipating what the alternative would be is neither necessary in order
to engage in radical critique, nor possible. Such an alternative is only going to
emerge from actual practical struggles; and only in retrospect can it be theoretically
grasped. Theorizing on its own is too abstract and indeterminate to anticipate what
radical shifts in normative orientation and social organization would amount to.
Indeed, this insight has been important for Honneth’s own work, specifically the
pride of place he has assigned to struggles for recognition, not least due to the role
they can play in normative and institutional innovations or even revolutions.
54 Freedom’s Right, 196/356–57.
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The point can be amplified, if we consider again the possibility of ideology: status
quo-reinforcing false consciousness might not just be a bad guide for deciding
whether active support of social practices renders them progressive, but might
extend so far that even our faculties of theorizing and imagination are chained,
ultimately, to reproducing the status quo. Instead of genuine alternatives, all we can
conceive of is a tax reform or granting mothers an extra year towards the qualifying
condition for the state pension. In sum, if we treat “the fact that there do not seem
to be practical alternative to the economic system of the market” as decisive, then
we are no longer doing context-transcending critique (whether it be guided by
immanent standards or not).55 Then, we let how things socially appear determine
our theorizing (and associated practices), rather than trying to look behind the
social facade as Critical Theory aspired to do and search for practical innovations
and social struggles that point to a radical alternative.
It is thus unsurprising to see that Honneth in Freedom’s Right does not think of
social pathologies and other social aberrations as indicting our social world in such
a way that revolutions are required to address them. Rather, they are now
understood on the model of an immanent critique with a reformist orientation: as
deviations from norms that are already embedded in the social fabric and that could
be realized without fundamental changes to it.56
There now emerges more clearly than in the earlier papers, or possibly as a third
novelty,57 a distinction between two kinds of social deviations: social pathologies
and “misdevelopments [Fehlentwicklungen ].” The latter are social problems which
are also not well-captured in terms of (procedural) injustice. The difference from
social pathologies is that social pathologies have to do with internal features of the
spheres of legal and moral freedom in which they arise (law and morality), whereas
misdevelopments are due to the influence of external factors on the spheres of social
freedom, which, according to Honneth, cannot be pathological.58 By way of
example, Honneth regards the phenomenon that people end up seeing everything
through the lens of how it will help them in litigating others as a social pathology
insofar as it is, at least in part, due to how the notion of legal freedom lends itself for
becoming absolutized in such a way; on the other hand, he regards certain
deformation of the public sphere as not due to the notion of democratic will-
formation or what this notion lends itself to, but due to external influences (such as
by unregulated media empires).
In the following, I immanently criticize both (a) the characterization of social
pathologies in Freedom’s Right and (b) the distinction between social pathologies
55 A critique can be immanent, but context-transcending, for example, because it involves showing how by criteria
accepted within a social context (say regarding freedom or democracy) that social context cannot but fall significantly
short of these criteria.
56 See also “Die Krankheiten der Gesellschaft,” 56, 58. One might think that I am here stepping beyond the immanent
strictures of critique of Honneth to which I committed myself – after all, his Hegelianism may only allow reformist
social critique. In reply, I note that Hegelianism need not be quite as restrictive – it can allow for the possibility that a
society is so immanently contradictory as to require revolution and/or reconstruct not just the practices central to
reproduction of the society as it is, but also those within it that point beyond it. For further discussion of these issues, see
Schaub’s contribution to this issue (“Misdevelopments, Pathologies, and Normative Revolutions”).
57 See footnote 2.
58 Freedom’s Right, 66, 128–29/125, 230–31.
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and misdevelopments (or, at least, the application of this distinction to the specific
examples Honneth provides for each).59
IV. 1. Critique of the new characterization of social pathologies
In the first substantial discussion of social pathologies in Freedom’s Right (i.e. when
discussing pathologies of legal freedom), Honneth basically adopts something like
Zurn’s characterization – indeed, he explicitly refers to the latter in a way that
signals his agreement with it.60 Unlike (procedural) injustices, where people are
wrongly excluded from social processes of cooperation, the problem in the case of
social pathologies has to do with the “reflective access” to the actions and norms
that constitute these processes. Specifically, due to systematic social influences (not
limited to capitalism), participants misunderstand these actions and norms, or their
significance.61 Strictly speaking, this deviates from the schema Zurn operates with
insofar as the disconnect is not between the first-order beliefs of people and their
second-order reflection on them, but instead between the norms of practices and
people’s reflection on these. Whether it is still helpful to speak of second-order
disorders here – when the first-order referent has changed such that it is not of the
same kind as the second-order referent (it is not merely about beliefs, but
institutionalized norms) – is questionable, but I leave that aside in what follows.
The important point is that in Freedom’s Right there is a disconnect between the
actual rationality of norms in social practices and the participants’ reflexive uptake
of these norms (or of their significance) – a disconnect that is itself (purportedly)
caused by some internal dynamics of the norms in question (in contrast to
misdevelopments, where the disconnect is caused externally). This disconnect,
which affects how people participate in social practices, then also leads to
violations of social rationality. Thus, in a way social pathologies are, according to
Honneth’s most recent account, more “in the head” of the participants, albeit that
the cognitive misunderstanding has real effects on the objective rationality actually
achieved by social institutions and practices.
This new account does not fit well the examples Honneth analysed prior to
Freedom’s Right, such as notably the case of organized self-realization introduced
earlier: in that case, the first-order content (the modes of self-realization) is false qua
being inauthentic, rather than – as it should be on the new account – true as
appropriate norm for the domain in question. Also, the second-order awareness of
this falsity is not a misunderstanding of the first-order content – just the opposite:
the suffering comes from the truthful recognition of the falsity of the first-order
content and the social pressures of pretending to take it up nonetheless.
Here we also see how the new account has tamed social pathologies considerably –
rather than the diagnosis implying an indictment of the “new spirit of capitalism”
(as in the case of the organized self-realization), on the new account the implication of
59 Further problems with Honneth’s reformist agenda are discussed in Schaub’s contribution to this issue
(“Misdevelopments, Pathologies, and Normative Revolutions”).
60 Freedom’s Right, 86/157.
61 See also Freedom’s Right, 113/206.
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such a diagnosis is that there are tendencies towards one-sided and therefore
mistaken interpretations of norms and practices, where these norms and practices,
if adequately contained, are completely acceptable.62 The problem is how people
interpret the world,63 not that it needs changing at a fundamental level. The radical
potential of the diagnosis of social pathologies has been swallowed up by Hegelian
actuality.
The four social pathologies Honneth now lists, correspondingly, lack any
explosive potential for the current social world. In the sphere of legal freedom, two
forms of juridification can occur, namely (a) when people view everything through
the lens of how it will help them to successfully make claims in court (with the 1979
film Kramer vs. Kramer as paradigmatic example) or (b) when people become
totally paralysed and indecisive (with B. Kunkel’s novel Indecision as paradigmatic
example). In the sphere of moral freedom, the two are (c) rigid moralism (as
captured in the novels of Henry James) and (d) morally motivated terrorism (as in
the RAF member Ulrike Meinhof). Each of these requires efforts to enable
participants to gain a better understanding of the norms in question and
containment of the norms by social freedom; the response to none requires a
different social world – with different underlying norms – altogether.
Before turning to the critique of Honneth’s distinction between social pathologies
and misdevelopments, we should discuss one further novelty of Freedom’s Right.
Honneth now characterizes social pathologies as different from “social
accumulation of individual pathologies or psychological disorders.”64 One might
think that Honneth means to exclude mere accumulation of individual disorders –
in contrast to socially caused accumulation. Yet, Honneth seems to want to go
further: for him, social pathologies are not socially caused individual ills, but social
ills that may or may not be also appear as individual ills.
This impression is confirmed in Honneth’s most recent discussion of social
pathology. In “Die Krankheiten der Gesellschaft” (published after Freedom’s
Right), he clearly states that it is society which is ill when we speak of social
pathologies – not individuals (or a sufficiently large accumulation thereof). He also
provides two examples of how society can be ill without its individual members
(also) being ill – Arendt’s account of how consumerism leads to a growing
disinterest in public deliberation about public and common affairs; and Durkheim’s
suggestion that anomie will undermine social solidarity. However, Honneth admits
that some form of individual suffering – albeit perhaps not suffering that is
medically recognized – is necessary for the purpose of the diagnosis of social
pathology. The picture seems to be that such suffering is the symptom which alerts
us to the illness, but not itself part of that illness.
62 Nor would it help to reply that that the phenomena like organized self-realization are merely rebranded as
misdevelopments – as such, they would also be part of a reformist agenda, since they would then concern negative
external influences on norms and practices (of social freedom) which are also deemed completely acceptable in
themselves and that can be protected from such influences by reforms.
63 This is not to say that the problem is merely “in the head” – rather the wrong interpretation leads, on Honneth’s new
account, to sub-optimality in existing social institutions. My point is that even these problems “in the world” are from
the outset so conceptualized in Freedom’s Right that they cannot call this (social) world and its norms into question at
the fundamental level.
64 Freedom’s Right, 86/157.
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This strikes me as implausible. My worry is here not motivated by
methodological individualism – I am happy to grant that society might be a
collective actor which cannot be adequately captured in a way that reduces it to the
actions of individuals. Rather, it is motivated by normative individualism: if
something is not bad for individuals at some level, then it is not bad at all.65 Applied
to the issue of social pathology: society can only be ill if, in some broad sense,
individuals within it (or affected by it) are ill (in the broad sense that their well-
being and/or self-realization is detrimentally affected). This need not mean that the
ill that befalls society is exactly the same as that that befalls individuals. It need also
not mean that the individuals realize that they are ill because society is ill, or even
that they realize that they are ill at all. It even need not mean that the social
processes in question have to negatively affect the individuals directly involved in
carrying these processes out. But it does mean that if, for example, consumerism is a
problem because it leads to disinterest in common affairs, this must involve,
however indirectly, that consumerism is bad for individual human beings – not just
so that we can find out that society is ill, but as part of what it is for society to be ill.
I cannot hope to demonstrate this conclusively here, but let me oncemore adopt the
strategy of immanent critique to show that evenHonneth ought to accept it. Honneth
points out that the analogy with illness that talk of social pathology rests on requires
that certain core features of illness are replicated in the notion of social pathology.
Following Mitscherlich, he counts among these core features the “experience of a
restriction of the opportunities for freedom [Erleben einer Verengung von
Freiheitsspielra¨umen ].”66 And he suggests that this could be captured at the level of
society, when its different functional spheres – such as, presumably, legal freedomand
social freedom, or even different practices of social freedom (personal relationships,
market society and democratic will formation) – do not work harmoniously together.
Whatevermerit this suggestionhas, it is implausible that the various functional spheres
could “experience” the lack of harmony existing between them without individuals
experiencing it at some level (i.e. not necessarily consciously or in a way that is
epistemically transparent in the sense of revealing the problem and its causes to them).
Thus, even on Honneth’s own notion of what illness involves, it is implausible that
society can be ill without individuals being ill.67
IV. 2. Critique of the distinction between social pathologies and
misdevelopments
To recall, in Freedom’s Right Honneth introduces (or at least makes explicit) a
distinction between social pathologies, which are due to internal developments of
65 One strong objection to this view concerns non-human nature. This would require more space to discuss than I can
devote to it here, but I would either include non-human living objects among individuals or adopt an appropriate
modification – for example to qualify the claim, such that it says that only intra-human infliction of bads can be fully
captured by normative individualism.
66 “Die Krankheiten der Gesellschaft,” 58–9.
67 Not only is a view that ties social pathology necessarily to individual illness (broadly conceived) more plausible as a
view about illness than Honneth’s latest view, it also would not be committed to an organicist conception of society.
Hence, it would be compatible with the work of first generation critical theorists.
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the norms and practices in question, and misdevelopments, which result from
external influences.68 On the face of it, this distinction does not exclude the
possibility that the same norms and practices could be affected by both social
pathologies and misdevelopments, but Honneth’s overall theoretical architecture in
Freedom’s Right excludes this. Instead, social pathologies are related to legal and
moral freedom – the two inferior forms of freedom, which for Honneth (as for
Hegel before him) are important ingredients of a good and well-ordered society, but
whose importance and standing should not be exaggerated. Only as part of, and
means to, an overall social freedom do they have a place in a good and well-ordered
society, and social pathologies result exactly whenever these two freedoms are
taken as more than that. On the other hand, social freedom – roughly modelled on
the idea of love, such that the pursuit and realization of your ends is reciprocally
implied in the pursuit and realization of my own ends, and vice versa – is not just a
superior freedom which provides the proper framework and the preconditions for
the other two, but is so innocent and pure – just like love is often thought to be–
that it can never be at fault when things go wrong within its practices and
institutions. In this way, misdevelopments are reserved for the practices of social
freedom, and only legal and moral freedom’s deviations are due to their internal
structure.
It is harder to keep track of the misdevelopments that Honneth discusses in
Freedom’s Right than of the social pathologies he lists and also harder to know
whether (and how) one should bundle or disaggregate them.With this caveat, let me
suggest that there are thirteen misdevelopments discussed in Freedom’s Right.
In relation to the market, there are: (1) corporations controlling our needs (rather
than our controlling corporations in line with our needs);69 (2) immiseration in the
early phases of the capitalist labour market;70 later on, (3) deskilling of the workers
and the impossibility of their feeling recognized asmakingmeaningful contributions
to social cooperation;71 and, more recently still, (4) the deregulation of the labour,
capital and finance markets, along with cuts in social and legal protection of
workers and their real income as well as an intensifying individualization of
responsibility.72 In relation to democratic will-formation, there are various possible
misdevelopments in relation to the public sphere – (5) commercialization of the
media;73 (6) the related developments of the media’s controlling the way people
perceive reality and to what aspects of it they pay attention;74 (7) fragmentation of
the public sphere into mutually isolated niches (perhaps in part due to the
internet);75 (8) alternatively, the uniformity of the public sphere;76 (9) consumerism
68 There is an irony here to the choice of terms: in the medical context from which the metaphors are borrowed,
pathologies typically involve an external pathogen, whereas in this context misdevelopments are often due to genetic
and thus “internal” causes.
69 Freedom’s Right, section 6.2.2, especially 203, 219–20/370, 403–4.
70 Freedom’s Right, 233–34/410–11.
71 Freedom’s Right, 234/411.
72 Freedom’s Right, 243–53/451–70, most explicit on 246–47, 252–53/458, 468–70; see also Hartmann &
Honneth, “Paradoxes of Capitalism.”
73 Freedom’s Right, section 6.3.1, notably 273/507–8.
74 Freedom’s Right, 295–97/551–54.
75 Freedom’s Right, 276, 303/513, 565.
76 Freedom’s Right, 276–77/514–15.
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that leads to political apathy and disinterest;77 (10) nationalist misappropriation of
the public sphere;78 misappropriation of the rule of law, be it (11) nationalist or (12)
class-based in character.79 Indeed, even (13) the state-led corporate capitalism of,
for example, post-WWII West Germany is presented as a misdevelopment in that it
contributed to financial crises (presumably especially sovereign debt crises) and led
to political apathy due to the increase in the influence of lobbies and the way
political parties turned into cartels of political power.80
I cannot here do justice to the wealth of this material, but let me at least make
some critical observations, starting with two smaller ones. The first one is that a
number of social problems that prior to Freedom’s Right were counted by Honneth
as social pathologies – notably (2) and (3) above – have now become
misdevelopments. This might seem to be merely a rebranding of them. However,
in one sense it is even more reformist than the new account of social pathologies is:
reframing these problems as misdevelopments suggests that the sphere in which
they occur – the market – and its associated norms are itself unproblematic and
should merely be protected from external influences (rather than overcome or at
least contained in virtue of an in-built tendency to generate social pathologies).
The sphere and its norms are removed from critical view, with a sole emphasis of
critique on external influences.
The secondobservation is that it is not clear that all of the above canbedifferentiated
from (procedural) injustices – indeed (11) nationalist or (12) class-based
misappropriation of the rule of law are clear examples of what we commonly would
view as injustices. They alsomeetHonneth’s own definition of injustices (“unnecessary
exclusion from or restriction on opportunities to participate in social processes of
cooperation”).81There is a real dangerhere that social deviations fromnorms – be they
social pathologies or misdevelopments – become an amorphous catch-all category.
More importantly, the distinction between social pathologies and misdevelop-
ments is problematic at least insofar as it is not clear that the sorting of the
phenomena by Honneth into one or the other category is defensible, even on his
own characterization of them. Indeed, this might indicate a more fundamental
problem: that we cannot say in a sufficiently robust and clear way what is caused
internally and what is caused externally to a system of action (and its norms) to
mark the distinction Honneth is after.82
77 Freedom’s Right, 280–83/521–26. While Honneth would view this as a misdevelopment if it had materialized, he
seems sceptical about its actually materializing.
78 Freedom’s Right, 264–66, 284, 308/490–93, 527, 573–74.
79 Freedom’s Right, section 6.3.2, notably 306–8, 309, 311–14, 318–21/571–74, 576–77, 581–85, 594–99.
80 Freedom’s Right, notably 324–26/604–8.
81 Freedom’s Right, 86/157.
82 One might reply that this leaves in place the second criterion by which Honneth distinguishes social pathologies
from misdevelopments, namely that the former pertains to individual (legal and moral) freedom and the latter to social
freedom. However, there is no rationale to distinguish between social aberrations affecting individual and social
freedom respectively, if these norms were not also distinguished as to whether or not they have in-built tendencies to
produce aberrations. For the former distinction on its own is not one about the nature of social aberrations – we would
have the same kind of aberration pertaining to (what might be) different spheres. Also, Honneth anyway does not draw
the distinction between individual and social freedom in a clear-cut and stable way. For example, he holds that the
expansion of individual rights (such as consumer rights) – that is the expansion of individual (legal) freedom – was
“doubtlessly a normative advance” in a sphere of social freedom (Freedom’s Right, 230/425).
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Let us start with his new account of social pathologies. In relation to moral
freedom, he talks of it as both (a) generating its own one-sidedness83 and (b) as
containing an “internal boundary” which subjects do not grasp in the cases of its
two social pathologies (rigid moralism and moral terrorism).84 The former fits with
the characterization of social pathologies as due to internal causes, but the latter
point suggests a different picture, according to which the subjects misapply a
principle, which is itself internally limited in its application and hence not at fault
for such misapplication. Indeed, it is this latter picture which is dominant in
Honneth’s account of rigid moralism, which he describes as arising only when we
forget our context and selves and when we overextend the principle of self-
legislation.85 Honneth at least owes us an account of why the principle of self-
legislation that is both context-bound (as he argues against Korsgaard and
Habermas; see above) and internally delimited nonetheless by itself leads to its
misapplication (or has a tendency to do so). Indeed, in the case of morally
motivated terror that Honneth discusses – the RAF and especially Ulrike Meinhof
– one wonders whether the overextension of the principle of self-legislation has not
more to do with the specific configuration of the political and media landscape of
the 1960s and 1970s – and thus with factors external to moral freedom (on
Honneth’s account).
Now consider misdevelopments, which allegedly are due to external factors.
Among the thirteen examples discussed by Honneth, there are cases which seem to
fit this schema. For example, Honneth in a somewhat surprising move blames the
introduction of social rights and consumer protection at the individual level for the
demise of the consumer cooperatives, whom he views as much more effective to
counter corporations’ control of our needs and also as better instantiation of social
freedom in the consumption sphere. If he is right about the causal nexus here,
then this would seem to provide an example of how an influence external to social
freedom – namely legal freedom – brings about a misdevelopment of
social freedom. However, even this case is not straightforward: for one thing, is
not the initial problem the increasing control corporations have over what we desire
and need, and if so, is not this problem generated internally to the consumption
sphere (and thereby, if Honneth is right that it is a practice of social freedom,
internal to social freedom)? Also, are not the introduction of social rights and
consumer production results, at least in part, of the exercise of social freedom in the
sphere of democratic will-formation, so that, even if the influence is via legal
freedom, in fact it is generated within social freedom itself, just a different sphere or
practice of it? And, indeed, how would we conclusively decide whether such
influences, given the complex causal nexus they likely exhibit, are internal or
external to social freedom?Might they not be internal in one respect and external in
another, and if so, which respect should be determinative?
83 Freedom’s Right, 104/190. Unfortunately, this does not come out as clearly in the translation, since the crucial clause
“von ihrer selbst befo¨rderte” which precedes “Vereinseitigung” is omitted from the English version.
84 Freedom’s Right, 114/207.
85 Freedom’s Right, 116, 117/210, 213.
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To take another example, the experience of Nazi Germany provides a clear
instance of the sort of nationalistmisappropriationof the public sphere thatHonneth
has in mind, and he, indeed, refers to it.86 Yet, Honneth himself insists that the
development of the democratic public sphere was helped along by the formation of
nation states and national background cultures.87 This suggests that the nationalist
misappropriation of the public sphere is an overextension of the social freedom of
democratic will-formation at a particular point of its development, rather than an
external distortion of it.
The key point here is that empirical examples, to which Honneth invariably
refers, regularly manifest complex and multiply construable features. It is often
difficult to discern the precise nature, and causal history of these problematic social
developments. In cases like these the application of the distinction between social
pathologies and misdevelopments does little to clarify the situation; indeed, it often
adds an extra layer of complexity which becomes even more difficult to disentangle.
As a consequence the application of the distinction becomes of limited use; and the
distinction itself (in its failure to map onto real world examples) begins to appear
questionable.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, I have reviewed the various ways the notion of social pathology has
been conceptualized by Honneth and Zurn, and subjected them to criticism on the
basis of their own aims and argumentative moves. In the work of the early
Honneth, this notion is tied to a model of critique that is based on a formal ethics
and anthropology. I suggested that he was too quick in excluding more immanent,
historically specific, and context-dependent approaches. Interestingly, Honneth in
his recent work has moved to a more immanent approach, albeit while retaining the
ambition for universalist validity. This ambition, I have argued, is in conflict with
his own criticisms of context-independent justifications (such as those advanced by
Forst). Moreover, the particular immanent approach he has adopted is problematic
in constricting, without adequate justification, the possibility for social critique
in a way that breaks with the tradition of (the first generation of) Critical Theory,
contrary to Honneth’s intention of continuing this tradition. Finally, Honneth’s
development of the notion of social pathology and social deviation more generally
faces, I have shown, further problems insofar as he severs (counterintuitively and
contrary to his own standards) the link to individual suffering and introduces a
separation between two kinds of deviation that is difficult, if not impossible, to
uphold. These problems are fuelled in part by Zurn’s influential attempt to offer a
general schema for social pathologies, which, as I have also demonstrated, does not
fit well with the core cases Honneth advances (and Zurn aims to capture).
This paper has been relentlessly critical. There is, I believe, a place for such papers.
Instead of breaking here with this critical spirit, I will indicate what negative
conclusions I do not believe to be warranted by what I have argued. In particular,
86 Freedom’s Right, 271, 278/503, 517.
87 Freedom’s Right, esp. 262ff/487ff.
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nothing I said implies that the notion of social pathology cannot be conceptualized
differently within the Critical Theory tradition. Indeed, phenomena like Honneth’s
proposed case of organized self-realization strike me as calling out for such
conceptualization.Mypoint has been that an alternative proposal of how todo this is
necessary – one that leaves space for radical social critique and that conceptualized
them in terms of detriments to individualwell-being that is socially caused. This need
not mean that it invokes context-independent or universalist criteria – just the
opposite: I think the empty formalism worries that the later Honneth advances
against Forst and others speak decisively against this option. Instead, one live option
is to return to the middle period of Honneth’s work and the broader notion of
normative reconstruction he operated with then, which encompassed not just the
social institutions involved in the reproduction of the existing social world, but also
the countercurrents to it. Alternatively – or perhaps additionally – one might
approach social pathologies less as a unified set of phenomena with the same
necessary and sufficient conditions than as a set of related and partly overlapping
phenomena. For this – what Zurn calls – “mid-level methodological eclecticism”
might be most apt.88 The task would be to carry out a research programme of a
constellation of phenomena that mainstream liberal theory either cannot capture at
all or only inadequately – a programme that, at the same time, does not domesticate
social critique or eschew normative individualism.
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